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I. Introduction
Using drugs meant for individuals with medical needs to carry out 
executions is a misguided effort to mask the brutality of executions 
by making them look serene and peaceful—like something any one 
of us might experience in our final moments.
1
 
So wrote Alex Kozinski, the iconoclastic
2
 chief judge of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a stinging dissent from that court’s July 
2014 denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in the capital punishment 
case of Wood v. Ryan.
3
  The dispute pivoted on the execution of convicted 
double-murderer Joseph Rudolph Wood III,
4
 and it raises the timely and 
important constitutional issue at the heart of this article. 
Specifically, how much support do three well-established theories of 





 and self-realization/human dignity
7
—provide for establishing 
a new First Amendment
8
 right of public access to detailed, factual 
information about lethal-injection personnel, procedures, and drugs?  Those 
theories are significant because the current state of First Amendment 
doctrine, particularly under the two-part test from Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II)
9
 for access to government 
1. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1102–03 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), vacated, 
135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). 
2. See Carl Tobias, A New No. 1 at the 9th Circuit, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/opinion/oe-tobias30 (“[Kozinski] enjoys a well-deserved 
reputation as an iconoclast or, some would say, eccentric.  Born to Holocaust survivors in 
Bucharest, Romania, Kozinski came to the U.S. at 12.”).  Kozinski was first appointed to the 
Ninth Circuit in 1985.  See Kozinski Wins Seat on U.S. Appeals Court in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Nov. 
8, 1985, at News 10 ( “[The] Senate confirmed a controversial nominee, Alex Kozinski, to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco yesterday[.] Kozinski, 35, will become the youngest 
federal appellate judge in the nation.  For the past three years, he has been chief judge of the U.S. 
Claims Court in Washington, D.C.”). 
3. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
4. Id. at 1077–78.
5. See infra Part IV, Section A (providing an overview of this theory).
6. See infra Part IV, Section B (providing an overview of this theory).
7. See infra Part IV, Section C (providing an overview of this theory).
8. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety years ago through 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and 
local government entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
9. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986).  This case is
referred to later in this article as Press-Enterprise II in order to distinguish it from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in the case of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 
(1984), which is dubbed Press-Enterprise I.  In Press-Enterprise I, the Court held that the voir 
dire process in criminal cases is presumptively open.  It reasoned, in relevant part, that “[t]he 
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proceedings,
10




Slated to die by lethal injection on July 23, 2014, Wood went to 
federal court seeking an injunction stopping his execution until the Arizona 
Department of Corrections (ADC) and its director, Charles Ryan, produced 
to him the following data: 
[T]he source(s), manufacturer(s), National Drug Codes (NDCs),
and lot numbers of the drugs Defendants intend to use in his 
execution; non-personally-identifying information detailing the 
medical, professional, and controlled-substances qualifications 
and certifications of the personnel Defendants intend to use in his 
execution; and information and documents detailing the manner in 
which Defendants developed their lethal-injection drug protocol.
12
Wood argued that the ADC’s and Ryan’s refusal to produce this 
information violated a First Amendment “right of access to governmental 
proceedings.”
13
  Wood’s motion, as explained later in more detail,
14
 was 
rejected on July 10, 2014, by U.S. District Judge Neil Wake.
15
  Just nine 
days later, however, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed 
Wake’s ruling in a split, two-to-one decision.
16
  It marked the first 
recognition ever by a federal appellate court of a First Amendment right to 
know details about the source of execution drugs.
17
 
Two days later, with the clock quickly ticking toward Wood’s 
execution, a divided Ninth Circuit denied the ADC’s and Ryan’s petition 
presumptive openness of the jury selection process in England, not surprisingly, carried over into 
proceedings in colonial America.” Id. at 508. 
10. The two parts of this test relate to the “experience and logic” of requiring access.  Press-
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.  These are deemed “complementary considerations.” Id. at 8.  The 
experience component examines “whether the place and process have historically been open to 
the press and general public.” Id.  The logic prong, in turn, evaluates “whether public access plays 
a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id.  
11. Infra Part III (describing the application of the Press-Enterprise II test in three cases
involving requests for access in 2014 to detailed data about lethal injections). 
12. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2014), rev’d, 759
F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
13. Id. at *7.
14. Infra Part III, Section A.
15. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *20.
16. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
17. See Erik Eckholm, Court Delays Execution Over Secrecy with Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 2014, at A11 (quoting Jennifer Moreno of the Death Penalty Clinic at the University of 
California, Berkeley, for the proposition that “this is the first time a circuit court has ruled that the 
plaintiff has a right to know the source of execution drugs”). 
   
4 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:1 
for a rehearing en banc.
18
  That refusal prompted Judge Kozinski’s dissent 
quoted at the start of this article.
19
  Kozinski passionately added that 
executions “are brutal, savage events, and nothing the state tries to do can 
mask that reality.  Nor should it.  If we as a society want to carry out 
executions, we should be willing to face the fact that the state is 
committing a horrendous brutality on our behalf.”
20
  Nonetheless, he 
predicted the U.S. Supreme Court would overrule the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and, in turn, allow Wood’s execution to proceed as scheduled.
21
 
Indeed, on July 22, 2014—just one day before Wood’s planned 
execution—the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s preliminary 
injunction.
22
  The high court cursorily explained that “[t]he district judge 
did not abuse his discretion in denying Wood’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 




Ultimately, Wood’s death the next day apparently proved every bit as 
brutal and excruciating as Chief Judge Kozinski proclaimed executions 
inherently are.
24
  In fact, it took nearly two full hours for Wood to die
25
—
far longer than the average
26
 of about nine minutes.
27
  Furthermore, some 
witnesses claimed the procedure “left Wood gasping for air,”
28
 and 
18. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1103.
21. See id. at 1102 (“I have little doubt that the Supreme Court will thwart this latest attempt
to interfere with the State of Arizona’s efforts to carry out its lawful sentence and bring Wood to 
justice for the heinous crimes he committed a quarter century ago.”).  
22. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
23. Id. at 21.
24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25. See Matt Pearce et al., Execution Takes Two Hours, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at AA1
(noting that Wood “received an injection at 1:52 p.m.,” and reporting that the injection procedure 
“became so prolonged that reporters witnessing the execution counted several hundred of his 
wheezes before he was finally declared dead at 3:49 p.m.—nearly two hours after the procedure 
began”). 
26. See David Biello, Bad Drugs: Lethal Injection Does Not Work as Designed, SCI. AM. 
(Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lethal-injection-does-not-work-as-
designed (“In North Carolina inmates took an average of nine minutes to die (and much longer 
before flawed drug protocols were changed), and in California cessation of the heartbeat took 
from two to eight minutes after the last injection of the heart-stopping potassium chloride.”); Matt 
Pearce, I Don’t Think He’s Going to Die, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2014, at A1 (“Some lethal 
injection executions succeed within 10 minutes.”). 
27. See Arif Kahn & Robyn M. Leventhal, Medical Aspects of Capital Punishment
Executions, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 3 (2002) (noting that lethal injections took an average of 8.4 
minutes). 
28. Miranda Rivers, Lethal-Injection Drug Registration is Renewed, ARIZ. DAILY STAR
(Tucson), Sept. 7, 2014, at C4. 
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“[s]everal reporters on the scene agreed with one of Wood’s lawyers that 
Wood was gasping and snorting for more than an hour.”
29
  The Baltimore 
Sun reported that “[i]t took so long for Wood to die after receiving an 
injection of midazolam combined with hydromorphone that his attorneys 
had time to file an emergency appeal asking officials to save his life as the 
drugs apparently failed to fully take hold.”
30
  In fact, Wood’s lawyers “even 
called Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court.”
31
 
Although the ADC vehemently disputed accusations that Wood’s 
execution was “botched,”
32
 the editors of the Los Angeles Times bluntly 
opined in its aftermath that “death penalty protocols should not be kept 
secret.”
33
  Gene Policinski, vice president and executive director of the 
First Amendment Center, added that although “the First Amendment won’t 
settle the controversy over the death penalty,” “the core freedoms it 
protects can provide the means for the self-governed to effectively debate 
and decide issues facing our nation.”
34
  Cassandra Stubbs, director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union’s Capital Punishment Project, concurred 
that “[i]nstead of hiding lethal injection under layers of foolish secrecy, 
these states need to show us where the drugs are coming from.”
35
 
29. Bob Egelko, Botched Executions Spark Judge’s Call for Firing Squad, S.F. CHRON.,
July 25, 2014, at A1. 
30. Matt Pearce et al., Attorneys File Appeal as Inmate Slowly Dies, BALT. SUN, July 24,
2014, at 7A. 
31. Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly Two Hours to Execute Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, July 
24, 2014, at A1. 
32. The Arizona Department of Corrections issued a statement the day after Wood’s death 
that asserted, in relevant part, that: 
Media reports, some of which were made prior to any information officially 
being released on the day of the execution, reached the premature and 
erroneous conclusion that this execution was ‘botched’.  This is pure 
conjecture because there is no medical or forensic evidence to date that 
supports that conclusion.  
In fact, the evidence gathered thus far supports the opposite. The IV team, 
which includes a licensed medical doctor, verified multiple times during the 
procedure that the inmate was comatose and never in pain.  The record clearly 
shows the inmate was fully and deeply sedated beginning at 1:57 PM – three 
minutes after the administration of the execution drugs – until he was 
declared deceased at 3:49 PM.  
Press Release, Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, Department of Corrections Statement on 
Review of July 23 Execution (July 24, 2014), https://corrections.az.gov/article/depart 
ent-corrections-statement-review-july-23-execution. 
33. Editorial, Misery of Mis-Executions, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2014, at A20.
34. Gene Policinski, Seeking the Ultimate ‘Redress of Grievances,’ TENNESSEAN (Aug.
 10, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/08/11/seeking-ultimate-re 
dress-grievances/13866547.  
35. Press Release, ACLU, Arizona Botches Execution, Imposes Cruel and Unusual
Punishment on Joseph Wood (July 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/print/capital-punishment/ 
arizona-botches-execution-imposes-cruel-and-unusual-punishment-joseph-wood. 
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The importance of the question of establishing a First Amendment 
right of access to the details of death penalty facts and procedures that 
Policinski and Stubbs intimate goes well beyond Wood’s case.  As the 
Washington Post reported, his death occurred “just months after a botched 
execution in Oklahoma.”
36
  In that case, “rather than dying from lethal 
injection, Clayton Lockett died of a heart attack 40 minutes after the first of 
the drugs had been administered.”
37
  Indeed, as the New York Times wrote, 
“Wood’s execution was the fourth troubled one” in 2014.
38
 
Critically, the Ninth Circuit was not the only appellate court in 2014 to 
consider an issue like that in Wood v. Ryan.  In June of that year, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Wellons v. Commissioner
39
 
rebuffed the argument of convicted rapist and murderer Marcus A. Wellons 
that “the dearth of information regarding the nature of the pentobarbital that 
will be used in his execution and the expertise of those who will carry it out 
violates the First Amendment.”
40
  The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s conclusion (and the Georgia Department of Corrections’ 
argument) that “while there may be First Amendment implications 
involved in the openness of government operations, the cases Wellons 
relies upon turn on the public’s, rather than the individual’s, need to be 
informed so as to foster debate.”
41
 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in May 2014 in Owens v. 
Hill,
42
 considered the constitutionality of Georgia’s refusal to reveal 
information to convicted murderer Warren Lee Hill, who was sentenced to 
death.  Hill sought “the names and other identifying information of the 
persons and entities involved in executions, including those who 
manufacture the drug or drugs to be used.”
43
  The Georgia high court 
rejected Hill’s First Amendment-based access argument, finding “a 
longstanding tradition of concealing the identities of those who carry out 
those executions.”
44
  The court reasoned that, in light of privacy concerns 
36. Mark Berman, Execution Takes Nearly Two Hours, WASH. POST, July 24, 2014, at A3.
37. Editorial, Horror Stories in the Death Chamber, SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), July 
27, 2014, at P2. 
38. Fernanda Santos & John Schwartz, A Prolonged Execution in Arizona Leads to a
Temporary Halt, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/us/a-
prolonged-execution-in-arizona-leads-to-a-temporary-halt.html.   
39. 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014).
40. Id. at 1267.
41. Id. at 1266.  The appellate court cited the following cases upon which Wellons
apparently relied in his First Amendment argument: Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 
U.S. 596 (1982); Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. 
Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
42. 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 449 (2014).
43. Id. at 796.
44. Id. at 805.
   
2015 ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT LETHAL INJECTIONS 7 
and protecting those involved in performing executions from harassment 
and retaliation, keeping secret the names of executioners was justified.
45
  
The court added that while “the executioner who actually inflicts death 
upon the prisoner is the most obvious party in need of such protection, we 
believe that the same logic applies to the persons and entities involved in 
making the preparations for the actual execution, including those involved 
in procuring the execution drugs.”
46
  In November 2014, the U.S. Supreme 
Court passed on the opportunity to hear the case.
47
 
All of this judicial jockeying occurs just as “public support for the 
death penalty, though still high, has been falling.”
48
  A Gallup poll 
conducted in October 2014 found that 63% of those surveyed favored the 
death penalty for individuals convicted of murder—a figure far lower than 
the high of 80% in 1994.
49
  A 2013 survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Center found that while 55% of Americans “said they favored the death 
penalty for convicted murderers, that was the lowest support level in four 
decades; support has been falling for the past two decades.”
50
 
Furthermore, the odds of malfunction during a lethal injection may be 
higher today.  That is partly because the American Board of 
Anesthesiology now takes the “position that an anesthesiologist should not 
participate in an execution by lethal injection and that violation of this 
policy is inconsistent with the Professional Standing criteria required for 
ABA Certification and Maintenance of Certification in Anesthesiology or 
any of its subspecialties.”
51
  As Professor Deborah Denno explains, the 
paradox is that “[t]he people most knowledgeable about the process of 
lethal injection—doctors, particularly anesthesiologists—are often reluctant 
to impart their insights and skills.”
52
  In another article, Denno puts it far 
more bluntly: “legislatures delegate death to prison personnel and 
executioners who are not qualified to devise a lethal-injection protocol, 
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Hill v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 449 (2014).
48. Moshik Temkin, How to Kill the Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2014, at A13.
49. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last
visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
50. Drew DiSilver, Botched Execution in Oklahoma Renews Death Penalty Debate, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/30/botched-
execution-in-oklahoma-renews-death-penalty-debate.  
51. Commentary, Anesthesiologists and Capital Punishment, AM. BD. OF ANESTHESIOLOGY
(May 2014), http://www.theaba.org/pdf/CapitalPunishmentCommentary.pdf. 
52. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the
Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 53 (2007). 
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much less carry one out.”
53
  Boer Deng and Dahlia Lithwick encapsulated 
well this aspect of the problem in Slate in May 2014: 
[I]t’s clear that the reason lethal injection has become more
gruesome and violent in recent years is at least partly a result of 
opposition to the death penalty.  Lethal injection was supposed to 
be the humane alternative to firing squads and hangings.  But as 
American physicians sideline themselves and European 
pharmaceutical firms (and American ones with global ties) decline 
to supply the most known and efficacious lethal-injection drugs, 
corrections officials have been pushed to use inferior methods and 
substandard providers.54
Perhaps most significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in January 2015 
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Glossip v. Gross.
55
  There, the 
Court will consider a trio of questions related to the constitutionality of 
lethal-injection drug protocols and Eighth Amendment
56
 concerns of cruel 
and unusual punishment.
57
  As the Los Angeles Times put it shortly after the 
Court granted certiorari, “[s]ome of the justices have been eager to act after 
a year in which three executions in three states had serious problems, with 
inmates seeming to suffer while being put to death.”
58
  Lethal injections are 
now squarely caught in both the judicial and public crosshairs. 
This article, bridging First Amendment doctrine with theory, examines 
whether the First Amendment should provide a right of access for both 
death-sentenced defendants and the public to obtain detailed information 
regarding the implementation of lethal injections.  Part II initially provides 
a brief primer on the two-part doctrine typically applied by courts to 
53. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 
66 (2002). 
54. Boer Deng & Dahlia Lithwick, Liberal Guilt: In the Push to Abolish the Capital
Punishment, Opponents of the Death Penalty Have Made It Less Safe, SLATE (May 9, 2014, 5:14 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/death_penalty_in_ 
america_how_the_push_to_abolish_capital_punishment_has.html. 
55. 135 S. Ct. 1173 (Jan. 23, 2015).
56. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. 
CONST., amend. VIII.  The cruel and unusual punishment clause has been incorporated through 
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–240 
(1972). 
57. See Questions Presented, Glossip v. Gross, No. 14-7955, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-07955qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) 
(setting forth the three questions in the case). 
58. Michael Muskal, Back Story; Reviewing Executions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2015, at A2.
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determine if the First Amendment provides a qualified right of access to 
certain governmental proceedings.
59
  It also notes how some courts are 
stretching this right beyond the confines of courtrooms and judicial 
proceedings.  Part III then examines how courts in the abovementioned trio 
of 2014 cases—Wood, Wellons, and Hill—applied variations of this 
doctrine when analyzing the issue of access to facts about lethal-injection 
drugs, personnel and procedures.
60
 
Next, Part IV moves beyond the First Amendment doctrinal issues to 
the realm of free speech theory from which those doctrines spring.
61
  
Specifically, it explores how three venerable theories of free expression 
support expanding the doctrine to include a right to such information.
62
  
Finally, Part V concludes by asserting that the U.S. Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari in a future death-by-lethal-injection case and, in turn, 
resolve the issue by moving beyond the narrow confines of the Press-
Enterprise II doctrine
63
 to recognize that First Amendment theory demands 
access to more detailed data regarding lethal injections.
64
 
II. First Amendment Doctrine on Public Access Rights: From
Courtrooms to Executions to Horse Round-Ups 
This part initially provides, in Section A, a brief overview of the two-
part test the U.S. Supreme Court applies for determining if the public 
possesses a First Amendment right of access to certain judicial 
proceedings.  Section A does so because, as Part III later makes clear, the 
courts in the death-by-lethal-injection cases of 2014 all applied some 
variation of it.  Section B then describes how some courts are willing to 
expand a First Amendment right of access beyond courtrooms to other 
proceedings, including the right to witness executions. 
A. The Experience and Logic Test
In Press-Enterprise II,
65
 the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 fashioned
what Professor Raleigh Hannah Levine describes as a “two-pronged 
59. Infra notes 65-136 and accompanying text.
60. Infra notes 137-244 and accompanying text.
61. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C. Bollinger & 
Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002) (“First Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the 
exigencies of specific cases.  The function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives 
attributed by theory to the Constitution and to offer principled grounds of justification for 
particular decisions.”). 
62. Infra notes 245-279 and accompanying text.
63. Supra text accompanying note 9.
64. Infra notes 280-304 and accompanying text.
65. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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experience and logic pre-test as the standard by which to determine 
whether a particular criminal proceeding [is] presumptively open.”
66
  Often 
referred to simply as Press-Enterprise II,
67
 the case centered on whether a 
Southern California-based newspaper possessed a First Amendment right 
of access to the transcript of a 41-day preliminary hearing in the 
prosecution of a man charged with multiple counts of murder.
68
 
In concluding that a “qualified First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted 
in California,”
69
 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the majority that a 
qualified right of access exists in light of “two complementary 
considerations.”
70
  Under the first consideration, the Court must consider 
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and 
general public.”
71
  Under the second factor, the Court evaluates “whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”
72
  Burger noted the nexus between these 
two prongs of the test, writing that “these considerations of experience and 
logic are, of course, related, for history and experience shape the 
functioning of governmental processes.”
73
 
Importantly, satisfying this test only establishes a qualified, rather than 
absolute, First Amendment right of access to a judicial proceeding.  To 
overcome the right and to limit public and press access: 
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must 
be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court 
must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the hearing, and it 
must make findings adequate to support the closure.
74
Courts have applied this standard to various types of courtroom 
proceedings, including trials involving juvenile defendants.
75
  For instance, 
in United States v. Three Juveniles
76
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
66. Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
1739, 1755 (2006). 
67. See supra note 9 (describing why the case is referred to as Press-Enterprise II).
68. Press-Enterprise II, at 3–5.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
75. United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1995).
76. Id.
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Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to close the proceedings in 
accordance with section 5038 of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
77
 
and the defendants’ request.
78
  As the First Circuit framed the standard to 
overcome the presumption of access in Three Juveniles, “reviewing courts 
must determine whether the closure is ‘essential to preserve higher values’ 
and ‘narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”
79
  Despite the “presumption 
of openness”
80
 of voir dire proceedings in criminal cases, the high 
“overriding interest”
81
 standard required by Press-Enterprise I to curtail the 
qualified right of access was satisfied by the need to protect “juvenile[s] 
from the stigma of a criminal record.”
82
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained in 2004 
that “[t]he burden to overcome a First Amendment right of access rests on 
the party seeking to restrict access, and that party must present specific 
reasons in support of its position.”
83
  In particular, the party seeking closure 
must prove the existence of a “compelling governmental interest” and that 
the order is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”
84
  This mirrors the 
rigorous strict scrutiny standard against which the constitutionality of 
content-based restrictions on speech are measured.
85
 
In summary, as Professor Cathy Packer writes, “courts now use what 
has come to be known as the ‘experience and logic’ test to determine which 
judicial proceedings must be open.”
86
  The seeds of this test and the right of 
public access evolved from the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
87
 involving “the right of the public 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1995).
78. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 92–93.
79. Id. at 88 (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
80. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508–10).
81. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
82. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 88.
83. Va. Dep’t State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004).
84. Id.
85. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (asserting that
because a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video games “imposes a restriction on 
the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict 
scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn 
to serve that interest”); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
(asserting that a content-based speech restriction can only stand judicial review “if it satisfies 
strict scrutiny,” opining that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest,” and adding that “if a less 
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative”). 
86. Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones and
Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573, 575 
(2013). 
87. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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and press to attend criminal trials.”
88
  Today, however, “federal courts of 
appeals have widely agreed that it extends to civil proceedings and 
associated records and documents.”
89
 
However, Professor Barry McDonald of Pepperdine University points 
out that the public right of access “has been relatively dormant at the 
Supreme Court level.”
90
  McDonald attributes that inactivity, in part, to the 
“daunting task of determining the scope of such a right.”
91
  Initially, the 
Court appeared to “carefully limit”
92
 its application to criminal trial 
proceedings.  Over time, however, many lower courts recognized a right of 
access to civil and criminal trials, as well as to records and documents 
associated with those trials.
93
  The Supreme Court’s failure to sufficiently 
address the issue has led to mishandlings of the experience and logic test 
among the lower courts. 
Attorneys Myron Steele and Peter Tslofias assert that implementation 
of the experience and logic test by lower courts beyond criminal trial 
settings demonstrates a “drastic departure from the United States Supreme 
Court’s ‘experience and logic’ jurisprudential standard.”
94
  Because the 
public right to access “is theoretically endless . . . it must be invoked with 
discrimination and temperance.”
95
  Failure to employ such measured 
judgment results in lower courts using their own discretion to deem “what 
is ‘good,’ ‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ as opposed to ‘what is constitutionally 
commanded by the First Amendment.’”
96
 
Furthermore, courts subjectively and inconsistently evaluate the 
history/experience prong of the test due to the absence of a narrow 
definition.  For example, the Committee on Communications and Media 
Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York pointed to 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor,
97
 an 
88. Id. at 558.
89. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014).
90. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards
a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 328 (2004). 
91. Id. at 296.
92. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1986)).
93. Id. at 304.  See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 n.11 (6th Cir.
2002) (explaining that several circuits have agreed that access to civil trials is presumptively 
open); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (extending the qualified right 
of access to court documents in criminal proceedings). 
94. Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning with the Constitutional Pendulum, 77
ALB. L. REV. 1365, 1382 (2013). 
95. Id. at 1381 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980)).
96. Id. at 1381–82.
97. 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985).
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administrative agency hearing.
98
  Applying the experience and logic test, 
“the court found ‘little historical tradition.’”
99
  Using its discretion, the 
court instead opted to examine “‘analogous’ civil trials.”
100
  Evaluating the 
“broad spectrum of administrative hearings, rather than narrow instances,” 
produced a tradition of openness.
101
  Such jurisprudential murkiness makes 
it difficult to confidently predict what constitutes a tradition of historical 
openness. 
B. Moving the Right Beyond the Courtroom
In a 2013 article, Professor Matthew Bunker describes “a small but
significant body of case law” that illustrates what he calls “the creative 
expansion by some lower courts of a First Amendment right of access 
originally intended for entry to judicial proceedings and courtrooms into 
the much broader arenas of access involving other branches and agencies of 
government.”
102
  This section provides an overview of some of those 
judicial reaches beyond the confines of courtrooms.  Such judicial 
extensions beyond courtrooms are relevant for purposes of this article 
because they indicate that some courts may, in fact, be willing to extend 
access rights to detailed data requests regarding lethal-injection drugs, 
personnel, and procedures. 
Significantly, part of this jurisprudence of access expansion relates to 
executions.  For instance, in 2012 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Associated Press v. Otter
103
 declared it “settled law,”
104
 at least 
within that circuit and dating back to a 2002 decision,
105
 that “the public 
enjoys a First Amendment right to view executions from the moment the 
condemned is escorted into the execution chamber, including those ‘initial 
procedures’ that are inextricably intertwined with the process of putting the 
condemned inmate to death.”
106
  Also in 2012, a federal court in 
Pennsylvania applied the experience and logic test to find a public right to 
98. Committee on Communications and Media Law of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, “If It Walks, Talks and Squawks . . .” The First Amendment Right of Access to 
Administrative Adjudications: A Position Paper, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 21, 50 (2005) 
[hereinafter “Committee on Communications”]. 
99. Id. (citing Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 575–76).
100. Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 575.
101. Committee on Communications, supra note 98, at 50 (citing Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 
616 F. Supp. at 575–576). 
102. Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Could Wild Horses Drag Access Away From 
Courtrooms?  Expanding First Amendment Rights to New Pastures, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 247, 
249 (2013). 
103. 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12128 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
106. Otter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12128, at *1 (quoting Woodford, 299 F.3d at 877).
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witness executions in the Keystone State.
107
  The court noted that 
“permitting the press to witness all phases of the execution contributes to 
the proper functioning of the execution process, in part because it allows 




On the other hand and more recently, an Oklahoma federal district 
court in December 2014 rejected the arguments of several news media 
organizations that there is a First Amendment right “to view and hear the 
entire execution process from beginning to end, which they describe[d] as 
the time from when the inmate to be executed enters the execution chamber 
until he leaves the chamber, dead or alive.”
109
  In rebuffing this argument, 
the court emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court had never granted a First 
Amendment right of access “outside the criminal adjudication process.”
110
  
Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in 2004 
“that neither the public nor the media has a First Amendment right to 
videotape, photograph, or make audio recordings of government 
proceedings that are by law open to the public,”
111
 including executions. 
Expansion of First Amendment access rights can be found in a few 
settings other than execution chambers and their viewing rooms.  For 
example, in 2013 a federal district court in Nevada applied the Press-
Enterprise II test and found that wild horse gathers conducted by the 
federal Bureau of Land Management “have historically been and remain 
open to the press and general public, and public access plays a significant 
positive role in the function of gather activities.  As such, the public has a 
right of access to gathers upon public lands.”
112
  The court noted that the 
evidence “establishes that public access to gather activities plays an 
important role in the function of the gather, namely protecting the interests 




In Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine,
114
 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 2013 considered whether a 
public right of access exists for arbitration proceedings under Delaware’s 
state-sponsored arbitration program.
115
  The appellate court found, after 
107. Phila. Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
108. Id. at 371.
109. Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318 (W.D. Okla. 2014).
110. Id. at 1324.
111. Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004).
112. Leigh v. Salazar, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (D. Nev. 2013).
113. Id.
114. 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
115. Id. at 512.
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applying the Press-Enterprise II experience and logic test, that the press 
and general public had access to both the “place and process” of arbitration 
proceedings.
116
  A major point of contention between the parties in Strine 
centered on which “history” under the experience prong was relevant—a 
narrow look at “the history of arbitrations”
117
 or a broad examination of 
“the history of civil trials.”
118
  The Third Circuit ultimately decided that 
both required examination.
119
  In doing so, it determined that: 
[T]he right of access to government-sponsored arbitrations is
deeply rooted in the way the judiciary functions in a democratic
society.  Our experience inquiry therefore counsels in favor of
granting public access to Delaware’s proceeding because both the
“place and process” of Delaware’s proceeding “have historically
been open to the press and general public.”
120
Furthermore, the Third Circuit reasoned that permitting access helps 
to “ensure accountability and allow the public to maintain faith in the 
Delaware judicial system,”
121
 overshadowing the “comparatively less 
weighty”
122
 potential harms of disclosure.  In March 2014, the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in Strine,
123
 thus 
leaving the Third Circuit’s decision intact. 
In Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
124
 the Ninth 
Circuit applied the experience and logic test to decide if Cal-Almond could 
access a list of almond growers eligible to vote in a referendum on the 
continuation of a marketing order.
125
  By finding a history of state statutes 
explicitly allowing such access
126
 and concluding that public access would 
“play a significant positive role in the functioning of any referendum, 
including this one,”
127
 the appellate court held that Cal-Almond satisfied 
the test.
128
  While the court ruled in favor of Cal-Almond, “the Ninth 
Circuit did not fully reach the merits of the constitutional access 
116. Id. at 518 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
117. Id. at 515.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 516.
120. Id. at 518.
121. Id. 
122. Id.
123. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
124. 960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 106–07.
126. Id. at 109.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 110.
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question”
129
 as the constitutional avoidance doctrine resulted in the court 
“interpreting a federal statute to allow access”
130
 instead. 
Administrative proceedings also have seen right to access claims, 
relying on the experience and logic test for evaluation.
131
  As Professor 
Levine notes, judicial treatment of these claims is “inconsistent and 
contradictory.”
132
  Cases with similar facts have produced split decisions, 
with some courts finding the test satisfied and others finding it unmet.
133
  
Furthermore, some courts have opined that the experience and logic test 
“should not be applied to administrative proceedings at all.”
134
  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for instance, has suggested that 
applying the test outside the context “of criminal court proceedings is 
‘questionable.’”
135
  Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit has expressed doubts about “whether the access right can attach 
outside the limited context of historically-open court proceedings.”
136
  
Although the right to access, viewed through the lens of the experience and 
logic test, is expanding, it is obvious that the understanding of just how far 
it reaches and where it can be applied is muddled at best. 
In summary, some courts have expanded the right of access beyond 
the narrow confines of courtrooms, ensuring openness where it historically 
has resided and rationally belongs.  The willingness to expand access in 
such cases, particularly the Ninth Circuit rulings involving access to 
executions, bodes well for those now seeking to stretch a First Amendment 
right of access to encompass data about lethal-injection drugs, procedures, 
and personnel.  The next part of this article thus examines three cases from 
2014 involving that precise issue. 
III. The Lethal-Injection Access Cases of 2014: Different
Applications of the Press-Enterprise II Test 
This part features three sections, each of which examines one of the 
three cases from 2014 involving a request by a death-sentenced inmate for 
access to detailed information about his scheduled execution by lethal 
injection.  In only one of these cases—namely, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Wood v. Ryan—did a court recognize a First Amendment-based right of 
access to such data.  More analysis is devoted below to Wood. 
129. Bunker & Calvert, supra note 102, at 254.
130. Id.
131. Levine, supra note 66.
132. Id. at 1759.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1770.
135. Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 1989).
136. Levine, supra note 66, at 1770.
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A. Wood v. Ryan
137
As noted in the Introduction, Wood centered on a First Amendment-
based access request by double-murderer Joseph Rudolph Wood III for 
information relating to the drugs and procedures that would be used in his 
then-pending execution by lethal injection.
138
  Specifically, Wood 
requested data such as the names of manufacturers and lot numbers of the 
drugs by which the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) planned to 
kill him, as well as the medical credentials and qualifications of the 
individuals who would administer his execution.
139
 
At the trial court level, U.S. District Judge Neil Wake readily and 
initially acknowledged two key facts: The existence of “a First Amendment 
right of public access to governmental proceedings”
140
 and the Ninth 
Circuit’s recognition in California First Amendment Coalition v. 
Woodford
141
 that the public has a “First Amendment right to view 




To analyze Wood’s request, Judge Wake then applied the two-part 
experience and logic test, which is described in greater detail in Part II, 
Section A, for access to governmental proceedings.
143
  Under this doctrine, 
courts consider both if there is a history and tradition of openness to the 
proceeding or information and “whether public access plays a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”
144
 
Judge Wake found that Wood offered “no authority for the proposition 
that the press and general public have historically been granted access to 
information identifying the manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs.”
145
  The 
judge also rejected Wood’s contention “that information identifying the 
manufacturer of the lethal-injection drugs is necessary to the public debate 
about the death penalty.”
146
  Wake reasoned here that the ADC already had 
disclosed to Wood the “type of drug, the dosage to be used, and the 
137. 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
138. Supra notes 3 and 4, 12-31 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (setting forth the precise data sought by 
Wood). 
140. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2014), rev’d, 759
F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
141. 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 870–871.
143. The test is sometimes referred to as the history and logic test. See generally Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 35, 46–47 (2005) (providing a brief overview of the history-and-logic test). 
144. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
145. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *15.
146. Id. at *15–16.
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expiration dates, as well as the fact that the drugs are domestically-obtained 
and FDA-approved.”
147
  Judge Wake refused to stretch the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling in Woodford to the case at bar, reasoning that Woodford “specifically 
addressed a public right to view the execution process.  That principle does 
not expand to encompass a First Amendment right to compel the 




This reasoning is important because it reveals a dichotomy in Judge 
Wake’s logic—specifically, one between witnessing/viewing a process or 
proceeding, on the one hand, and obtaining/possessing data about the inner 
workings of that process or proceeding, on the other hand.  Put slightly 
differently, Wake’s analysis suggests a crucial difference between 
observation of a government-performed, government-sanctioned event and 
possessing government-held data about that same event. 
Nine days after Wake denied Wood’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision.
149
  In doing 
so, the two-judge majority applied the same two-part Press-Enterprise II 
test
150
 to decide if Wood had raised the requisite “serious questions going 
to the merits of his First Amendment claim”
151
 needed to obtain a 
preliminary injunction. 
Critically, on the first prong of the Press-Enterprise II standard, the 
Ninth Circuit majority chose not to focus narrowly on whether there was a 
history of data access to lethal-injection procedures.
152
  Instead, it initially 
focused much more broadly “on the historic openness of the execution 
itself.”
153
  It reasoned here that the data sought by Wood was “inextricably 
intertwined with the execution.”
154
  In other words, the majority seemed to 
reject Judge Wake’s bright-line distinction described immediately above 
between observing proceedings (executions, in this case) and accessing 
information related to those same proceedings.
155
  The Wood majority 
quickly concluded, after taking note of long-standing access to executions 
when they historically were performed in public squares during the middle 
147. Id. at *16.
148. Id. at *16–17.
149. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
150. Id. at 1082–83.
151. Id. at 1080.
152. This contrasts directly with Judge Wake’s focus at the trial court level, where he found
“no authority for the proposition that the press and general public have historically been granted 
access to information identifying of the manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs.”  Wood v. Ryan, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *15 (emphasis added). 
153. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1083.
154. Id.
155. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit then dug deeper on the first prong of Press-
Enterprise II, delving into the historical question of access to data and 
information regarding executions generally—not simply those involving 
lethal injections.  Here, it concluded that “important details about early 
methods of executions were also public,”
157
 finding that “public accounts in 
some states supplied information about both the types of ropes used in 
hangings and the manufacturers who provided them.”
158
  The Wood 
majority reasoned that, historically, “[n]ewspapers reported openly on gas 
chambers, describing their size, cost, and makeup.”
159
 
Ultimately, the majority ruled for Wood on the first prong of the 
Press-Enterprise II test, concluding: 
  [Wood] provided evidence that executions in general have long 
been open to the public, and that information regarding the 
methods of execution and the qualifications of the executioners 
have been open as well.  This evidence, at a minimum, raises 
“serious questions” as to the historical right of access to the 
information Wood seeks.
160
The italicized parts of the above-quoted passage make it evident that 
the majority focused broadly on executions in general, rather than narrowly 
on lethal-injection executions.  This clearly helped Wood, given the 
relative recency of lethal-injection executions in the United States.  It was 
not, in fact, until 1977 that “Oklahoma pioneered the first lethal-injection 
protocol.”
161
  The Sooner State’s three-drug protocol—“thiopental, an 
ultra-short-acting barbiturate anesthetic; pancuronium bromide, a paralytic 
inhibiting muscle movement; and potassium chloride, which induces 
cardiac arrest”
162
—later was adopted during the 1980s and 1990s by thirty-
seven states.
163
  Lethal injection now is the most common method of 
execution, with one law journal article noting that it was used “in 929 of 




160. Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
161. Seema Shah, How Lethal Injection Reform Constitutes Impermissible Research on
Prisoners, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2008). 
162. Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1367, 1376 (2014). 
163. Id.
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the 1099 executions in the United States from the re-establishment of the 
death penalty in 1976 to March 8, 2008.”
164
 
Turning to the second prong of the Press-Enterprise II test, the 
majority found that Wood “raised serious questions as to the positive role 
public access to the information he seeks would play in executions.”
165
  The 
court highlighted what it called “a seismic shift in the lethal-injection world 
in the last five years, as states have struggled to obtain the drug 
traditionally used in executions, thiopental.”
166
  Additionally, it pointed out 
that several flawed executions in 2014 “sparked public curiosity and debate 
over the types—and quality—of drugs that should be used in lethal 
injections.”
167
  The Wood majority clearly embraced what might be 
considered a “the-more-information-the-better” approach when it comes to 
data and details about drugs, drug companies, and executioners.
168
  It thus 
also ruled in favor of Wood on the second prong of the Press-Enterprise II 
standard, concluding he “raised serious questions on the merits as to the 
positive role that access to lethal-injection drug information and 




In dissent, Judge Jay Bybee drew the same proceedings-versus-data 
dichotomy suggested at the district court level by Judge Wake and 
addressed earlier in this article.
170
  Specifically, Judge Bybee wrote that 
“[t]he fundamental flaw in Wood’s request for a preliminary injunction is 
that Wood does not actually assert a right of access to a governmental 
proceeding.  The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment 
does not provide a general right to information in the government’s 
164. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying
Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 919, 920 (2008).
165. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1085.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. This is illustrated by the following statement from the Wood majority:
[M]ore information about the drugs used in lethal injections can help an alert
public make better informed decisions about the changing standards of
decency in this country surrounding lethal injection.  Knowing the source and 
manufacturer of the drugs, along with the lot numbers and NDCs, allows the
public to discern whether state corrections departments are using safe and
reliable drug manufacturers.  Similarly, knowing the specific qualifications of
those who will perform the execution will give the public more confidence
than a state’s generic assurance that executions will be administered safely
and pursuant to certain qualifications and standards.
Id. at 1085–86. 
169. Id. at 1086.
170. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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possession.”
171
  Judge Bybee elaborated on this line of logic, explaining 
that: 
  Wood does not seek access to a criminal proceeding, nor does 
he seek documents filed in a proceeding or transcripts of the 
proceeding.  Instead, he wants information in the government’s 
possession; effectively, he has taken the general right of the public 
to view executions and turned it into a FOIA [Freedom of 
Information Act] request for documents related to the 
execution.
172
Thus far, the analyses of Wood at both the district and appellate court 
levels suggest there are two major doctrinal sticking points for finding a 
First Amendment right of access—be it a public right or a personal right—
to detailed data regarding drugs, procedures, and persons involved in lethal 
injections. 
First, there is a problem on the history/experience prong of Press-
Enterprise II regarding whether courts should look narrowly at the history 
of access to lethal injections (a procedure in place in the United States only 
since 1977) or more broadly at the history of access to executions 
generally, regardless of their mode. 
Second, there is a question regarding whether the dichotomy between 
access to proceedings/events and access to data/information referred to and 
recognized by Judge Bybee in his dissent,
173
 but rejected by the majority, is 
a valid one.  Compounding this second problem is the fact that where 
courts have recognized the existence of a First Amendment right of access 
to documents, it exists only in “judicial records,”
174
 which seemingly would 
not include records formulated by the ADC and requested in Wood. 
Two days after the Ninth Circuit granted Wood’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, it denied a petition for rehearing en banc.
175
  That 
denial sparked Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent quoted at the start of 
this article.
176
  Although siding with Judge Bybee’s dissent in the Ninth 
Circuit’s earlier ruling, Kozinski wrote to express the view that “[a] 
tremendous number of taxpayer dollars have gone into defending a 
procedure that is inherently flawed and ultimately doomed to failure.  If the 
171. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1092 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1093 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
173. Supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
174. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 707 F.3d 
283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013). 
175. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
176. Id. at 1102–03 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
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state wishes to continue carrying out executions, it would be better to own 




The next day, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s 
preliminary injunction, holding simply that Judge Wake “did not abuse his 
discretion in denying Wood’s motion for a preliminary injunction.”
178
  The 
Court thus never wrestled (at least in published written form) in any depth 
whatsoever with Wood’s First Amendment access arguments.  As noted in 




B. Wellons v. Commissioner
180
In July 2014—the same month the Ninth Circuit decided Wood v.
Ryan—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the 
First Amendment did not provide Marcus Wellons with an unbridled right 
to information about the drugs or personnel involved in his impending 
lethal injection.
181
  In Wellons v. Commissioner, the Georgia Department of 




One year earlier, Georgia had passed the Lethal Injection Secrecy Act 
(“Secrecy Act”),
183
 which classifies all “identifying information”
184
 about 
the people or entities involved in the manufacture or administration of 
drugs used in lethal injections as a “confidential state secret.”
185
  Georgia, 
in fact, “is among a number of states that recently passed so-called secrecy 
laws in an effort to maintain access to lethal-injection drugs, particularly 
after many drug companies, fearing political backlash, declined to sell 
them.”
186
  In accord with the Secrecy Act, the GDC thus only provided 
Wellons with a copy of the lethal-injection procedure, which called for a 
one-drug injection protocol of pentobarbital.
187
 
177. Id. at 1103.
178. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
179. Supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
180. 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2838 (2014).
181. Id. at 1267.
182. Id. at 1262.
183. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d) (2013).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Richard Fausset, U.S. Judge Denies Stay of Execution in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2014, at A13. 
187. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1262.
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Wellons challenged the Secrecy Act on two main constitutional 
grounds—the Eighth and First Amendments.
188
  First, Wellons argued that 
the Eighth Amendment gave him the right to information that would help 
him ascertain whether the use of pentobarbital is, per the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition, “cruel and unusual.”
189
  Because the GDC had 
not possessed any FDA-approved pentobarbital for more than a year, 
Wellons reasonably feared the GDC would inject him with a substance that 
it “purports to be pentobarbital, but that has been manufactured from 
unknown ingredients and in unknown circumstances by a compounding 
pharmacy.”
190
  The use of this unknown drug would pose an “unacceptable 
risk of pain, suffering, and harm”
191
 because compounding pharmacies are 
not subject to FDA regulation, Wellons averred.
192
 
The appellate court reasoned that for Wellons to prevail on his Eighth 
Amendment claim, he needed to prove that the use of this substance would 
be “‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.’”
193
  




Next, Wellons argued that the First Amendment afforded him the right 
to details about pentobarbital and its manufacturer because a lethal 
injection is a “governmental proceeding.”
195
  Here, he relied on the Press-
Enterprise II history/experience and logic test, arguing that, historically and 
prior to the adoption of the Secrecy Act, the GDC would have provided 
both him and the public with “detailed information about the drugs used in 
188. Id. at 1264–67. Wellons also challenged the statute under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which the court did not discuss at length. Id. 
189. Id. at 1264.
190. Id. at 1262.
191. Id. at 1264.
192. Id. According to the FDA’s website, “compounding” is the process of combining two or
more drugs to create a new medication. Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, 
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCom 
pounding/ucm339764.htm#what (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).  This process is overseen by a 
licensed medical professional, but compounded drugs are not approved by the FDA. Id.  Instead, 
state boards of pharmacy have authority over compounding pharmacies. Id.  The FDA warns that 
drugs “made using poor quality practices may be sub- or super-potent, contaminated, or otherwise 
adulterated.” Id. 
193. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008)) (emphasis in 
original).  In Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), a fractured Supreme Court rejected an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. Id. at 63.  In doing so, it cited 
“today’s consensus” that lethal injection was the most humane way of conducting an execution. 
Id. at 62. 
194. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1265 (citing Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir.
2013)). 
195. Id. at 1266.
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executions.”
196
  On the logic prong, Wellons insisted “an informed public 
debate is critical in determining ‘whether execution by lethal injection 
comports with the evolving standards of decency which mark the progress 
of a maturing society.’”
197
 
The court summarily rejected this argument as well, holding instead 
that “neither the Fifth, Fourteenth, or First Amendments afford Wellons the 
broad right ‘to know where, how, and by whom the lethal-injection drugs 
will be manufactured,’ as well as ‘the qualifications of the person or 




Although the Wellons per curiam opinion did not discuss the overlap 
between the Eighth and First Amendment challenges, concurring Judge 
Charles Wilson highlighted the GDC’s hypocrisy and Catch-22 nature of 
Wellons’ predicament: 
  I write separately to highlight the disturbing circularity problem 
created by Georgia’s secrecy law regarding the methods of 
execution in light of our circuit precedent . . . [Wellons] must 
show that the manner in which Georgia intends to execute him 
generates “a substantial risk of serious harm”
199
 . . .  Possibly due 
to his lack of information about the compound pentobarbital that 
will be used and the expertise of the people who will administer 
his execution, Wellons has not shown such a risk.  Indeed, how 
could he when the state has passed a law prohibiting him from 
learning about the compound it plans to use to execute him?
200
Wilson agreed that Wellons fell short of his Eighth Amendment 
burden of proof, but feared the consequences of the GDC’s need to 
withhold information from inmates, the public, and even the courts, 
“especially given the recent much publicized botched execution in 
Oklahoma.”
201
  Wilson urged that access to information about lethal-
injection protocol is necessary for courts to carry out their constitutional 
role of determining whether an execution violates the Eighth Amendment 




197. Id. (quoting Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir.
2002). 
198. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1267.
199. Id. (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).
200. Id. at 1267–68.
201. Id. at 1268.
202. Id.
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The same day the Eleventh Circuit rejected Wellons’ First and Eighth 
Amendment arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Wellons’ twin 
requests to stay his execution and for a writ of certiorari.
203
  He was killed 
shortly thereafter, marking what the Washington Post noted was “the 




C. Owens v. Hill
205
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Wellons, the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Hill upheld Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act,
206
 in part because of a 
long history and tradition of concealing the identities of execution 
participants for their protection.
207
  Warren Lee Hill, an inmate at the Lee 
County Correctional Institute, faced death by lethal injection for murdering 
another inmate.
208
  A county judge sentenced Hill to death in an order 
issued only two days after the effective date of the Secrecy Act.
209
 
Georgia thus only informed Hill that the drug used in his execution 
would be produced by a compounding pharmacy.
210
  Hill sued, seeking 
access to sealed information about the “identity of the compounding 
pharmacy and the supply chain and manufacturer(s) of any and all 
ingredients used to produce the lethal drug compound”
211
 that would be 
used in his injection.
212
  He brought constitutional claims under both the 
First and Eighth Amendments.
213
 
Citing Baze v. Rees,
214
 the Georgia high court explained that, to 
establish a viable Eighth Amendment claim, Hill needed to prove an 
“objectively intolerable risk of harm”
215
 resulting from the use of the 
203. Wellons v. Owens, 134 S. Ct. 2838 (2014).
204. Georgia Inmate Is First To Be Executed After Botched Lethal Injection, WASH. POST
(June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/major-child-porn-distributor-sent 
enced-to-30-years/2014/06/17/570b3efc-f65e-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html. 
205. 295 Ga. 302 (Ga. 2014).
206. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36 (2013).
207. Owens, 295 Ga. at 316, 318.
208. Id. at 302.
209. Id. at 303. The Secrecy Act took effect on July 1, 2013 and the sentencing court issued 
the order on July 3, 2013.  It set Hill’s execution for the week of July 13, 2013, effectively giving 
Hill only ten days to challenge the new law. See Andrew Cohen, New ‘Injection Secrecy’ Law 
Threatens First Amendment Rights in Georgia, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/georgia_lethal_injections_shie.php. 
210. Owens, 295 Ga. at 319.
211. Id. at 303
212. Id.
213. Id. at 304, 315.
214. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
215. Owens, 295 Ga. at 309.
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compound drug.
216
  To meet this high threshold of proof, Hill’s expert 
witness testified that drugs made in compounding pharmacies “are of less 
reliable quality”
217
 than those produced by manufacturers subject to FDA 
regulation.
218
  The expert estimated that thirty-four percent of the products 
labeled by the pharmacies as “sterile” were actually contaminated, but he 
admitted difficulty in knowing what percentage of compounded drugs are 
unsafe.
219
  Side effects from unsterile drugs include sudden drops in blood 
pressure, seizures, intravenous pain, pulmonary embolism, and death.
220
 
The Georgia Supreme Court was not persuaded.  It held that because 
prisoners become unconscious from an overdose of anesthetic before the 
lethal drug is injected, “the prisoner will never have an opportunity to 
suffer the negative medical effects . . . from a possibly non-sterile drug.”
221
  
It even opined that while contaminated drugs may have fatal side effects, 
“such a side effect obviously would be shockingly undesirable in the 
practice of medicine, but it is certainly not a worry in an execution.”
222
  
Thus, the court ruled that Hill failed to state a colorable Eighth Amendment 
claim because his expert “gave no clear indication regarding the level of 
risk involved.”
223
  The court then weighed this lack of evidence against the 
fact that pentobarbital is a common drug produced in a facility that 
manufactures “millions of prescriptions per year.”
224
 
The lower court in Hill held that the Secrecy Act violated the First 
Amendment because it denied Hill access to information and to 
government proceedings.
225
  In reversing this decision, the Georgia 
Supreme Court distinguished the “freedom to disseminate information 
already within one’s own possession”
226
 with what it believed to be the 
issue in Hill’s case, namely Georgia’s “refusal to disclose information 
within its control.”
227
  Based on this distinction, the court interpreted Hill’s 
argument as little more than bootstrapping a Freedom of Information Act 
216. Id. at 309–10.
217. Id. at 310.
218. Id.
219. Id.




224. Id. (citing Sells v. Livingston, 561 F. App’x 342 (5th Cir. 2014)).  Next, Hill argued that
the Secrecy Act violates his due process right to access to the courts.  In response, the court found 
that “losing in court is not the same as being denied access to the courts.” Id. at 313–14.  It 
reasoned that Hill’s access claim is “belied by the proceedings below and the instant appeal.” Id. 
225. Id. at 315.
226. Id. (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
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request to the First Amendment.  As the court reasoned, Hill could not 




Similarly, the court rejected Hill’s argument that he was denied access 
to a historically open government proceeding.
229
  Georgia’s high court 
applied the history/experience and logic test from Press-Enterprise II and 
ruled that Hill failed to satisfy both prongs.
230
  First, the court explained 
that, although public access to executions has been mostly open, 
“‘historically, executioners have hidden behind a hood—both literally and 
figuratively.’”
231
  Second, the court held that public access to lethal 
injections—and by analogy, access to information about the processes—
would play a negative role in the functioning of executions.
232
 
It relied on the importance of privacy to justify its conclusion under 
both prongs,
233
 holding that “[a]lthough many governmental processes 
operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize 
that there are some kinds of government operations that would be totally 
frustrated if conducted openly.”
234
  It also noted that maintaining the 
privacy of the drug manufacturers and executioners would protect those 
companies and individuals from harassment or retaliation by inmates and 
members of the public who oppose lethal injection.
235
  This, in turn, avoids 
the risk that drug manufacturers and executioners may, due to fear of 
reprisal, grow unwilling to perform their duties.
236
 
Dissenting, Justice Robert Benham recalled the gruesome and gory 
details of Oklahoma inmate Clayton Lockett’s lethal injection, in which his 
“veins failed, he reportedly twitched and mumbled, even after having been 
declared unconscious, and, although officials attempted to halt the 
execution, Lockett died forty-three minutes after the first drug had been 
administered.”
237
  Worst of all, Justice Benham noted, the cause of this 
botched execution remains unknown.
238
  Benham feared Georgia was “on a 
path that, at the very least, denies Hill and other death row inmates the 
228. Id. at 316.
229. Id. at 317–18.
230. Id. at 316.
231. Id. (quoting Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identites: Toward Recognizing a Right to Know 
Who Is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2829 (2007)). 
232. Id. at 317.
233. Id. at 316–317.
234. Id. at 316 (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10–12).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 317.
237. Id. at 318.
238. Id.
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rights to due process and, at the very worst, leads to the macabre results 
that occurred in Oklahoma.”
239
 
Benham rejected the majority’s privacy rationales, reasoning they did 
not justify forgoing “constitutional processes in favor of secrecy, especially 
when the state is carrying out the ultimate punishment.”
240
  Like Judge 
Charles Wilson, who concurred in Wellons, Justice Benham criticized the 
majority for its hypocrisy, stating that “the speculation permeating Hill’s 
claims arises solely from the State’s unwillingness, in light of the secrecy 
statute, to disclose information that would allow him to make more specific 
claims.”
241
  Benham belittled, if not scoffed at, the fact that Georgia 
promised Hill the drugs used in his execution would be safe.
242
  He claimed 




Proposing a compromise, Justice Benham suggested a solution that 
would foster the First Amendment and protect participants: 
  I would grant [Hill] access to information identifying the 
compounding pharmacy that produces his execution drug; 
although, I would direct that the information be released under 
appropriate safeguards to minimize any harm to individuals who 
are simply performing their jobs.  Likewise, because learning the 
source of the bulk materials used by the compounding pharmacy 
could lead to information supporting Hill’s cruel and unusual 
punishment claim, I would also order that information disclosed to 
Hill.
244
Thus, Justice Benham echoed a key argument in this article—that the 
First Amendment demands that the public and inmates have access to 
information about lethal injections, and that this access will not unduly 
disrupt the sensitive process. 
In summary, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Wood, 
which the U.S. Supreme Court quickly tossed out, the Press-Enterprise II 
doctrine failed to provide access to the inmates in Wood, Wellons, and Hill.  
Because doctrinal support for a First Amendment right of access to detailed 
information about lethal injections is weak at best, Part IV next addresses a 
239. Id.




244. Id. at 320.
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trio of First Amendment theories that, conversely, supports access to 
detailed data regarding lethal-injection drugs, personnel, and procedures. 
IV. A First Amendment Theory Perspective: Moving Beyond the
Realm of Dated Doctrine to Examine a Modern Controversy
This part explores how three time-honored theories of freedom of 
expression, although each being subject to scholarly criticism,
245
 support 
expanding a judicially created First Amendment right of access to certain 
governmental proceedings to also encompass requests for detailed factual 
information about lethal injections involving specific death-sentenced 
inmates. 
A. Marketplace of Ideas
What is the truth, as it were, about lethal-injection executions as they
are now carried out in the United States?  Are they really more humane or 
painless today than other forms of state-sponsored executions?
246
  Are the 
drug-based cocktails served up in some states of sufficient formula and 
strength to ensure speedy deaths?  Are the people, in turn, who mix and 
administer those drugs—morbidity mixologists, as it were—adequately 
trained to do so properly and effectively?  The marketplace of ideas theory, 
as described below, demands public access to all state-possessed 




 is, as First Amendment scholar Rodney 
Smolla writes, “perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech 
tradition.”
248
  At the heart of this theory, Professor Daniel Solove asserts, is 
the notion that free speech “contributes to the promotion of truth.”
249
  An 
open marketplace of ideas is valuable both because it allows the public to 
245. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the
Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61, 62 (Lee C. Bollinger 
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002) (referring to these three theories as a “tired trilogy of 
conventional free-speech justifications” that are “at worst so abstract and protean as to be of 
limited intellectual or practical utility”). 
246. The lethal injection “method was initially introduced precisely because it was supposed 
to be more humane than the electric chair or the gallows.” Serge Schmemann, Celebrating 
Sainthood and Witnessing Barbarity, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at Sunday Review 2.  
247. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859).  The origin of the marketplace of ideas theory can be traced back to John 
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, as Mill discussed the benefits of liberty.  The theory was not named, but 
the exact logic for free thought and discussion was. Id. 
248. Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 6 (1992).
249. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). 
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try to attain a truth
250
 and because it involves the never-ending process of 
seeking and testing supposed truths.
251
 
The marketplace theory thus provides a conceptual model for freedom 
of expression within a collective society, with the goal of “advanc[ing] 
human understanding about the nature of the world and the best way to live 
within it.”
252
  As John Stuart Mill wrote in On Liberty, “[a]ll silencing of 
discussion is an assumption of infallibility.”
253
  Rather than silence 
discussion, Mill posited that: 
[T]he only way in which a human being can approach to
knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be 
said about it by persons of every variation of opinion, and 
studying all the modes in which it can be looked at by every 
character of mind.
254
“[O]nly through diversity of opinion,” Mill averred, “is there, in the 
existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the 
truth.”
255
  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as Professor Stanley Ingber 
writes, is credited with introducing the marketplace of ideas “concept into 
American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States.”
256
  
In Abrams, Holmes argued that “the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”
257
  Nearly a 
full century later, Justice Anthony Kennedy reaffirmed this maxim and the 
power of the marketplace metaphor in United States v. Alvarez,
258
 writing 
for the plurality that “[t]he theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of 
250. The attainment of a political truth as a valuable result of the marketplace of ideas was
espoused by Justice Louis Brandeis in his concurrence in Whitney v. California, in which 
Brandeis suggested that truth could be ascertained through the “power of reason as applied 
through public discussion.” 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
251. The value implicit in the process of truth seeking was advocated by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, in which Holmes argued that “the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.” 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
252. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008). 
253. MILL, supra note 247, at 77.
254. Id. at 80.
255. Id. at 111.
256. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1984). 
257. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
258. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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The subjective and normative nature of ethical and political debates 
like those surrounding the death penalty and lethal-injection procedures are 
highly contestable, in part because society needs a higher order of 
judgments based on perceptions of reality and human nature to resolve 
them.
260
  Just as the way the news media frame an issue affects how the 
public perceives it,
261
 a lack of information and knowledge about an issue 
can equally distort reality.
262
  Thus, the public requires knowledge of facts, 
procedures, ideas, and perspectives to reach a proper resolution in such 
ethical and political matters. 
The marketplace of ideas suffers without a steady influx of 
information.  Detailed data about the drugs, personnel, and procedures used 
in lethal injections is necessary for the public to engage in robust, accurate, 
and fair discussions about the validity and vitality of the death penalty.  
Furthermore, this vigorous debate is necessary for the public to reach a fair 
political consensus about the procedures involved in carrying out a death 
sentence.  The nature of normative topics, especially sensitive ones like 
lethal injections, is that there are a variety of viewpoints.  The marketplace 
of ideas theory strives to include all viewpoints so that the public can reach 
the fairest consensus about even the most sensitive issues.  The theory thus 
demands that the public, as well as the condemned, receive as much 
information as possible to decide the truth about the state of lethal 
injections in the United States today. 
If the issue is framed as whether lethal injections provide a humane 
and painless way of killing a person, then knowing as much information as 
possible about how they are carried out (and who carries them out) can help 
the public and lawmakers to understand if it is, indeed, true that they are 
humane and painless.  Similarly, if the issue is posed as whether death by 
lethal injection today in the United States constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, then also knowing as much 
information as possible about how such injections occur can help the U.S. 
Supreme Court to reach its own truth about that question.  In brief, the 
marketplace theory strongly militates in favor of providing the public with 
access to as many facts and details as possible regarding the 
implementation of lethal injections.  The “truth” about lethal injections 
demands access to factual information that affects them. 
259. Id. at 2550 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
260. Gey, supra note 252, at 8.
261. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 15 (1989).
262. Paul R. Brewer & Kimberly Gross, Values, Framing, and Citizens’ Thoughts About
Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quantity, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 929, 931 (2005). 
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B. Democratic Self-Governance
Philosopher and educator Alexander Meiklejohn believed, as First
Amendment scholar Lucas Powe writes, “that freedom of speech is 
protected because it is an essential aspect of self-governance.”
263
  Professor 
Pierre J. Shlag concurs, asserting that Meiklejohn thought that “in a 
democratic society, self-government is an important value and that political 
or public speech is essential to self-government.”
264
 
In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government,
265
 Alexander 
Meiklejohn wrote that in the “method of political self-government, the 
point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of 
the hearers.”
266
  In other words, people must have access to as much 
information as possible to enable “the voting of wise decisions.”
267
 
Few discussions today, of course, are as fraught with politics as those 
involving the death penalty.
268
  Voters, in turn, hold the power to elect or 
reject politicians based upon their stances toward the death penalty.  As the 
Washington Post noted in 2012, “the repeal of the death penalty is a mixed 
bag for a politician with national aspirations.”
269
 
Meiklejohnian theory, with its emphasis on making voters wise by 
requiring “that everything worth saying shall be said,”
270
 is directly relevant 
for supporting public access to details about the drugs, personnel, and 
procedures used in lethal injections.  For a state like Arizona to deny the 
public access to these facts amounts to a government-sanctioned 
“mutilation of the thinking process,”
271
 to borrow Meiklejohn’s fine phrase.  
How so?  By not having all of the facts regarding lethal injections—facts 
already known to and possessed by the government, but now kept behind a 
legal wall—citizens can neither think clearly nor vote wisely.  Arizona 
must prioritize “the minds of the hearers”
272
—the minds of its citizens, the 
263. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN AMERICA 238 (1991). 
264. Pierre J. Shlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 671, 707 (1983).
265. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948). 
266. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
267. Id.
268. See Pema Levy, An Unlikely Conservative Cause: Abolish the Death Penalty, 
NEWSWEEK, May 23, 2014, at 1 (“[The Republican Party] is still squarely in the pro-death-
penalty camp.  Ending capital punishment, which for years critics have argued disproportionately 
affects minorities, is considered a liberal issue . . . [t]he Gallup poll [conducted in October 2013] 
showed 81 percent of Republicans support it, versus 47 percent of Democrats.”). 
269. John Wagner, Death Penalty Is at an ‘Impasse,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2012, at C1.
270. Meiklejohn, supra note 265, at 25.
271. Id. at 26.
272. Id. at 25.
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minds of its voters—above secrecy and paternalistically keeping them in 
the dark.  Voters need to be as knowledgeable as possible, having had the 
opportunity to hear all relevant data on lethal injections, in order to reach 
the best decision about a candidate who takes a public stance on the death 
penalty and, in particular, how it should be carried out. 
For instance, the Utah House of Representatives voted 39 to 34 in 
February 2015 to bring back the firing squad as a method of execution if 
the required drugs for a humane lethal injection are not available.
273
  The 
deep divide among Utah’s lawmakers, as reflected by the 39-34 split, 
demonstrates the contested political nature of death penalty procedures.  
Utah citizens, in turn, may consider how their representatives voted on the 
matter during the next election cycle.  Concomitantly, to decide if death by 
firing squad is really more humane than death by lethal injection, the public 
must have access to as many facts as possible about the latter method of 
death.  In brief, then, death by lethal injection is a matter of public concern, 
and voters must be provided with access to all relevant data that could 
influence and affect how they vote on matters related thereto.  
Meiklejohnian’s theory thus supports the creation of a First Amendment 
right of access for the public to receive detailed information regarding 
lethal injections. 
C. Self-Realization/Human Dignity
In addition to collectivist free speech goals such as discovering and
testing conceptions of the truth and enabling successful democratic self-
governance, speech—both the right to speak and the right to receive 
speech—can be inherently valuable to an individual.  Indeed, “individual 
self-fulfillment and participation in change are fundamental purposes of the 
First Amendment,” according to the late Professor C. Edwin Baker of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
274
 
Likewise, Thomas Emerson stressed that “freedom of expression is 
essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment.”
275
  
Importantly, Emerson asserted that when the government acts “to cut off [a 
person’s] search for the truth,” the government “elevate[s] society and the 




Thus, when Arizona cuts off an inmate’s access to the truth about the 
drugs, personnel, and procedures that will end his or her life, the 
273. Erica Palmer, Firing Squad Bill Passes Utah House After Tough Debate, SALT LAKE 
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274. Baker, supra note 261, at 51.
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government is depriving that inmate of the autonomy and ability to learn 
and to realize precisely how he or she will die.  In his concurrence in 
Whitney v. California, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that “those who won 
our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make 
men free to develop their faculties.”
277
  An inmate is denied the ability to 
develop his faculties when the government thwarts his access to 
information that affects how he will die.  If not for the possible physical 
pain one might endure, the mystery of what will happen during one’s last 
moments could be interpreted as a psychological torture of the worst kind, 
resulting in an abject failure to reach self-fulfillment.  One ends life without 
knowing precisely how it will be terminated.  Devoid of the ability to pass 
from this world with the grace of knowing oneself and one’s fate, human 
dignity is stripped from the executed just like his or her life. 
While the Arizona Department of Corrections in Wood may have had 
its reasons for withholding procedural information, the government should 
need to prove that these reasons are of a higher priority than one’s 
autonomy and self-realization.  The government must demonstrate that its 
limitations on transparency are worth stripping away the remaining dignity 
of fellow human beings in their final moments. 
In summary, as Justice Brandeis wrote more than eighty-five years 
ago in Whitney, the founders of the United States “eschewed silence 
coerced by law.”
278
  States like Arizona in Wood and Georgia in Wellons 
and Hill described in Part III engage in government-coerced silence about 
lethal injection facts and procedures.  They thwart, in Brandeis’s terms, 
“the power of reason as applied through public discussion.”
279
 
Ultimately, the marketplace of ideas theory requires the public be 
supplied by states with detailed facts about lethal injections so that society 
can attempt to know the truth about this method of death.  The theory of 
democratic self-governance, in turn, demands that voters have as much 
information as possible about such procedures and personnel in order to 
vote wisely in favor of or against politicians who support or condemn them.  
They may also need that information to vote wisely on state referenda and 
ballot initiatives related to the death penalty.  And, finally, the theory of 
self-realization requires that the condemned be informed of the facts about 
their pending deaths so that they will understand and be able to mentally 
confront exactly what it is that will end the liberty that is life. 
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V. Conclusion
Debate rages today about access to detailed information regarding 
lethal injections.  For example, in February 2015 Virginia lawmakers 
considered a bill under which executions in that state “would become 
shrouded in unprecedented secrecy”
280
 by shielding the names of drug 
manufacturers from public scrutiny.  As the Washington Post reported, 
“although the names and quantities of chemicals used would have to be 
disclosed, the names of the companies that sell them and information about 
buildings and equipment used in the process would be withheld.”
281
 
In the face of such measures, this article made the case that, regardless 
of the doctrinal problems of access under the Press-Enterprise II test 
experienced in the trio of 2014 cases examined in the Introduction and Part 
II, First Amendment theory demands public and inmate access to details 
about the drugs, procedures, and personnel involved in lethal-injection 
executions. 
As addressed in Part II, the experience and logic test from Press-
Enterprise II typically dictates the public’s access rights to governmental 
proceedings, including executions.
282
  This test requires judicial 
examination, first, of whether a process has been historically open, and 
second, whether access plays a “significant positive role” in the functioning 
of that process.
283
  At first glance, the right of access to information about 
lethal-injection drugs and the right of access to view executions, which was 
recognized by the Ninth Circuit both in California First Amendment 
Coalition v. Woodford
284
 and Associated Press v. Otter,
285
 seem similar 
enough that the history/experience and logic test should apply equally to 
both situations.  However, the test suffers from several flaws. 
In particular, satisfying the experience and logic test creates only a 
qualified right of access that courts have been unable to clearly define.
286
  
Thus, the application of the test has been, at best, mishandled and, at worst, 
ignored.
287
  This lack of precedent has placed immeasurable discretion in 
the hands of district court judges who are given the ability to decide what is 
“good” or “desirable” instead of what is “constitutionally commanded by 
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the First Amendment.”
288
  Because of this unbridled discretion, case law 
applying the history/experience and logic test is subjective and 




Application of the experience and logic test is inconsistent even within 
the single context of access to information about lethal injections.  For 
instance, in 2014 in Wood v. Ryan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted the experience prong of the test broadly.
290
  It reasoned 
that hangings and details about gas chambers were historically open to the 
public, and information about lethal-injection drugs were “inextricably 
intertwined” with the execution itself.
291
 Based on this, the court found a 
tradition of access to executions that conclusively extended to data about 
lethal injections.  It further held that a series of botched executions that 
year justified a “more-information-the-better” approach.
292
 
In stark contrast, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit and the Supreme Court of Georgia applied the same test as Wood, 
during the same year as Wood, but reached dramatically different 
conclusions with fatal results.  In Wellons v. Commissioner, the Eleventh 
Circuit failed to directly address the inmate’s arguments under the 
experience and logic test, and instead held merely that the First 
Amendment does not afford an inmate “the broad right to know” detailed 
information about his lethal injection.
293
 
In Owens v. Hill, the Georgia court relied on the interest of privacy to 
hold that it was in the best interest of the personnel involved in lethal 
injections to keep the information from public view.
294
  Only the 
concurrence and dissent in Wellons and Owens, respectively, highlighted 
the hypocrisy of the two courts in simultaneously requiring an inmate to 
bring specific Eighth Amendment claims while denying that inmate access 
to the details involved in those claims.
295
  The U.S. Supreme Court has not 
considered the rulings in Wellons or Hill, and it vacated the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Wood without addressing the First Amendment access 
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As mentioned in this article’s Introduction, public opinion about death 
by lethal injection is in a state of instability.
297
  Public support for the death 
penalty has dropped by nearly twenty percent in just as many years, and the 
American Board of Anesthesiology has explicitly removed itself from 
involvement in the lethal-injection process.
298
  As a result, the safety of 
lethal-injection procedures is in decline.
299
  Despite the horrific tales of 
Joseph Wood and Clayton Lockett—who gasped for air and suffered 
gruesomely before their drug cocktails took effect
300
—the vibrant and 
volatile debate about lethal injection itself implicates a trio of First 
Amendment theories. 
John Stuart Mill and the marketplace theory are famous for the 
proposition that “the only way in which a human being can approach to 
knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be said about it by 
persons of every variation of opinion.”
301
  The marketplace thrives on an 
abundance of information through which the public can sort and sift in an 
effort to attain truth about a topic, like lethal injections.  Only by wading 
through a flourishing marketplace of ideas can the public truly engage in 
robust, accurate, and fair discussions about the humanity of lethal 
injections. 
Similarly, only by possessing access to this abundance of information 
can the public reach an informed opinion, allowing it to participate in “the 
voting of wise decisions” as they exercise self-governance.
302
  The 
democratic self-governance theory asserts that political or public debate is 
essential to self-government.
303
  In the context of lethal injections, educated 
public debate about lethal injections is necessary for the public to remain 
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298. Id.
299. Deng & Lithwick, supra note 54.
300. Rivers, supra note 28, at C4 (describing the execution of Joseph Wood); Editorial,
Horror Stories in the Death Chamber, supra note 37, at P2.  In June 2015, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court refused to reverse a lower court’s decision denying Oklahoma Governor Mary 
Fallin’s motion to dismiss an open records request for documents relating to Lockett’s execution. 
Adam Marshall, Oklahoma Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Effort to Halt Public Records 
Lawsuit for Execution Records, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (June 11, 
2015), http://rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/oklahoma-supreme-court-unanimously-
rejects-effort-halt-public-record.  The often heavily redacted documents, which were requested 
and reviewed by journalists at the Tulsa World, reveal “just how much of a ‘procedural disaster’ 
Oklahoma’s execution of Clayton Lockett was.” Cary Aspinwall & Ziva Branstetter, Records 
Reveal Lack of Protocol in Clayton Lockett’s Oklahoma Execution, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 16, 
2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/homepagelatest/records-reveal-lack-of-protocol-in-clayton-
lockett-s-oklahoma/article_e4f17853-160c-530a-9f36-928a0fd9f605.html/. 
301. MILL, supra note 247, at 80.
302. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 265, at 25.
303. POWE, supra note 263, at 238.
   
38 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:1 
wise and informed when voting to elect representatives who have certain 
stances on the death penalty. 
Finally, the self-realization/human dignity theory posits that freedom 
of speech and expression are “essential as a means of assuring” man’s 
ultimate goal—“individual self-fulfillment.”
304
  This theory reflects the 
importance of access to information about lethal injections, particularly for 
the inmate himself. When the government restricts access to information 
about an impending lethal injection—especially in the wake of so many 
botched executions in 2014 alone—the government is effectively depriving 
an inmate of the ability to realize and understand his own death. 
These theories, coupled with the sorry state of the experience and 
logic test, demand a reexamination of the First Amendment access doctrine 
as it relates to lethal-injection drugs, personnel, and procedures.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a future death-by-lethal-injection 
case in order to untie the knot created by a misapplication of the experience 
and logic test.  Like the Ninth Circuit in Wood, the Court must move 
beyond the narrow barriers of the test to recognize that current public 
debate and First Amendment theory support—even require—access to 
detailed information about lethal injections. 
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